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Despite a growing body of work examining the expression of infants’ positive emotion
in joint attention contexts, few studies have examined the moment-by-moment dynamics
of emotional signaling by adults interacting with babies in these contexts. We invited 73
parents of infants (three fathers) to our laboratory, comprising parent-infant dyads with
babies at 6 (n = 15), 9 (n = 15), 12 (n = 15), 15 (n = 14), and 18 (n = 14) months of age.
Parents were asked to sit in a chair centered on the long axis of a room and to point to
distant dolls (2.5 m) when the dolls were animated, while holding their children in their
laps. We found that parents displayed the highest levels of smiling at the same time that
they pointed, thus demonstrating affective/referential synchrony in their infant-directed
communication.There were no discernable differences in this pattern among parents with
children of different ages. Thus, parents spontaneously encapsulated episodes of joint
attention with positive emotion.
Keywords: pointing, smiling, embodied cognition, intersubjectivity, affective -gestural synchrony
INTRODUCTION
Joint attention is the ability to capture and re-direct the atten-
tion of a social partner, and to follow another’s communicative
cues to a speciﬁc locus (e.g., Moore and Dunham, 1995; Bard
and Leavens, 2009; Leavens and Racine, 2009; Seemann, 2012).
Joint attention refers to a suite of triadic communicative skills
that typically develop in humans and apes late in their infancy
periods, near the end of the ﬁrst year of life, and includes such
behavioral developments as pointing, following the pointing and
gaze direction of others, using emotional information from a
caregiver to regulate one’s response to novel objects (social refer-
encing), and other tactics involving the coordination of attention
to a common focus (e.g., Carpenter et al., 1998; Butterworth,
2001; Striano and Bertin, 2005; Racine and Carpendale, 2007;
Bard et al., 2014). Under existing strictures in some contempo-
rary psychological theories, this kind of coordination requires
that babies develop a reasoning capacity, based on an ability
to represent the invisible contents of others’ minds; pre-verbal
human babies are held to point to things because they can rep-
resent the perceptions, even knowledge, of their social partners
and wish to manipulate those perceptions and those knowledge
states (see, e.g., Racine and Carpendale, 2007, for a review and
critique).
Joint attention in human infants occurs in social contexts char-
acterized by dynamically changing emotional contours. There
is a growing body of work examining the dynamic expres-
sion of infants’ positive emotion in joint attention contexts
(e.g., Adamson and Bakeman, 1985; Hobson, 1993; Messinger
and Fogel, 1998; Jones and Hong, 2001, 2005; Reddy, 2001,
2003; Striano and Bertin, 2005; Carpenter and Liebal, 2012).
For example Adamson and Bakeman (1985) reported high rates
of positive affect when infants from 6–18 months of age were
jointly engaged around objects with their mothers. Jones and
Hong (2001) reported that, late in the ﬁrst year of life, infants
begin to incorporate their own smiling behavior into intentional
communication with their mothers (and see Jones and Hong,
2005). Reddy (2001, 2003) outlined a developmental pathway
into triadic reference grounded in infants’ experiences of them-
selves as objects of attention and intentional actions. In particular,
Reddy’s account speciﬁes the affective qualities manifested dur-
ing infants’ early engagements with others as a ﬁeld of experience
that can be generalized to objects later in the ﬁrst year of life.
Recently, Carpenter and Liebal (2012) have described, in concep-
tual terms, the role of mutual visual regard with positive affect
between babies and their parents as a kind of acknowledgment
of the mutual awareness of the jointness of the interactions, the
idea being that babies and their mothers acknowledge the shared
nature of these joint attention episodes with mutual gaze and
smiles. These ﬁndings and conceptual advancements were pre-
saged by Hobson (1993), who speculated that “the development
of a child’s awareness of propositional attitudes might begin with
more or less direct perception of other people’s affective attitudes”
(p. 240). Thus, according to Hobson, affective awareness scaf-
folds or bridges later-developing conceptions of mental attitudes.
Few studies, however, have examined the moment-by-moment
dynamics of emotional signaling by adults interacting with babies
in these triadic contexts. These affective landscapes may have sig-
niﬁcant bearing on infants’ motivations to follow into another
person’s focus of attention, for example, following their pointing
gestures or their line of regard.
The present study was originally designed by Leavens and Todd
to examine parents’ coordination of the hands that they used to
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point to distant dolls arranged in an arc and to support their chil-
dren in their laps, the question being at what angular displacement
to left or right would parents switch the hands being used to phys-
ically support their babies in their laps and being used to point
(Todd and Leavens, in preparation)? Upon initial examination of
the videotaped footage, it seemed to be the case that the parents
were marking their own pointing gestures with bursts of positive
emotion. This has signiﬁcant bearing on a longstanding debate
in developmental psychology: are human children evolutionarily
prepared for engaging in joint attention, as argued by Tomasello
et al. (2007), or doparents shape infants’attention-orientedbehav-
ior with social reinforcement, as long argued by Moore (e.g.,
Moore and Corkum, 1994)?
In considering the different predictions of these two classes of
theory, we reasoned, following Leudar and Costall (2004), that
nativist accounts like that of Tomasello et al. (2007) assume that
there is an epistemological gap between a communicative behav-
ior and its psychological underpinnings; i.e., there is a theoretical
commitment to the idea that invisible psychological processes
cause communicative behavior, and it is the role of the devel-
oping infant to discover this relationship (see also Leavens et al.,
2005; Froese and Leavens, 2014, for discussions of this issue). As
a consequence of this embedded assumption, external features of
the ontogenetic contexts in which children develop their social
skills are assumed to be typical for the species. Therefore, we could
not specify any pattern of behavior, in advance, that could falsify
a theoretical claim of evolutionary preparedness for joint atten-
tion in humans (see also Bard and Leavens, 2014, for a review
of theoretical positions that omit developmental experience as
an explanatory factor in the development of social skills; also
see Bateson, 1972; Churcher and Scaife, 1982; Zukow-Goldring,
1997). In contrast, learning- or experience-based accounts of the
development of joint attention do make some global predictions
about the patterns of reward in the lived experiences of children
who are developing these skills (see, esp., Moore and Corkum,
1994; Reddy, 2003). In particular, if children are to learn to attend
to deictic signals, then there must be some way that these physical
acts are marked as being, somehow, special-in-relation-to external
objects and events.
Accordingly, we set out to characterize the smiling behavior
of the parents in this study in temporal relation to key events
in each of trials: at several time points before the doll was ani-
mated, at the moment the doll was activated, at the moment
of maximum extension of the parents’ pointing hands, at the
moment the pointing hand was maximally retracted, the moment
the doll’s activation ceased, and at two subsequent time points.
Our reasoning was that if parental smiling behavior was paired
with their referential signals (their points), then this would pro-
vide evidence relevant to at least two broad classes of theoretical
axioms: ﬁrst, as a kind of affective-referential precursor to the
affective-conceptual links described by Hobson (1993) and Reddy
(2001, 2003) and, second, as a pattern of contingencies in social
reward that could, in principle, exert the kind of socially grounded
attention-shaping processes required by Moore and Corkum’s
(1994) theory. Alternatively, if we did not ﬁnd a close tem-
poral association between pointing and smiling behavior, this
would have some bearing on the generality of developmental
process models grounded in environmental factors, like social
reinforcement; in other words, because learning models require
contingent social reinforcement, the present study comprises a
direct test of the hypothesis of socially based reward contingencies
in parent-infant interaction.
Of particular relevance to the emerging science of embodied
intersubjectivity is that the interactive phenomena we describe
here comprise bodily manifestations of the interactive accompa-
niments to pointing; thus, this experimental context is an ideal
test bed for exploring behavioral coordination in intersubjec-
tive activities. As Froese (2011) recently emphasized, the rapidly
emerging strands of embodied approaches to understanding cog-
nitive development, including enactivist and dynamic systems
theories, markedly expand the kinds of questions we can ask
about intersubjective engagement (e.g., Zukow-Goldring, 1997;
De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Wilson and Golonka, 2013). The
present context, in which parents point for their young children,
is ideal for examining the bodily vehicles of attention scaffolding.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We recruited parents with young babies through advertising
posters with tear-off cards on which were printed the contact
details of the infant study unit, at the University of Sussex. We
invited 76 parents of infants (3 fathers) to our laboratory, of whom
73 completed testing, comprising parent-infant dyads with babies
at 6 (n = 15), 9 (n = 15), 12 (n = 15), 15 (n = 14), and 18
(n = 14) months of age (two of the three remaining dyads were
excluded due to infant fussiness, and one because of experimenter
error—speciﬁcally, the videotape was accidently overwritten).
PROCEDURE
Parents were asked to sit in a chair centered on the long axis of a
5× 4mroomwith symmetrical illumination and abeige curtained
backdrop (Figure 1). The parents held the children in their laps.
Four mechanical dolls were arranged in an arc around the dyads,
2.5 m from their chair, at symmetrical angular displacements of 20
and 60◦ to the left and right of their midlines. Two video cameras
were placed, respectively, centrally and45◦ to the right of thedyads;
images were mixed to a split screen and this split screen image was
recorded on Super VHS video. Dyads were randomly assigned to
random sequences of doll activation so that each of the four dolls
were animated on the ﬁrst four trials and then this same sequence
was repeated for an additional four trials, rendering eight trials
per dyad. As each of the dolls was animated from a control room
adjacent to the laboratory, its “arms” and “legs” oscillated up and
down while auditory signals (a recorded female voice repeating
the phrase, “Hey, baby!”) were emitted from a speaker mounted
behind each doll’s ”head” for a duration of 5 s. Parents were asked
to point to the dolls when they were animated. No other speciﬁc
instructions were given.
CODING AND ANALYSES
The onsets of eight 1-s intervals were deﬁned for each trial: (a)
6 s prior to doll activation, (b) 3 s prior to doll activation, (c) the
instant the doll was activated, (d) the time at which the maximum
extent of parents’ points were displayed, (e) the time at which
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic of the experimental setup. Drawing not to scale.
the pointing hand was maximally retracted (note that in every
observation, the hand used to point was retracted and brought to
a clear, unambiguous resting position), (f) the moment the doll
was inactivated (5 s after doll activation), (g) 3 s after the doll was
inactivated, and (h) 6 s after the doll was inactivated. On each
of the eight trials, for each of these eight 1-s intervals, parents
were dichotomously classiﬁed as either “smiling” or “not smiling”
during that 1-s interval. On 27% of the 4,672 observation intervals
it was not possible to see the faces of the parents, so the dependent
variable was the proportion of trials across the eight intervals in
which the parents smiled, including only intervals in which the
parents’ faces were clearly visible. Because some infants became
fussy, the total number of trials per parent–infant dyad ranged
from 4–8 (we included all dyads that had completed at least four
trials). Because not every parent–child dyad participated in the
same number of trials, the dependent variable was the proportion
of trials in which parents smiled.
Two coding teams, each comprising independent pairs of
researchers, performed separate passes through the entire corpus,
each team coding to a consensus. Because, initially, we were inter-
ested in characterizing the intensity of smiling on each trial, the
ﬁrst coding team (Burﬁeld and O’Hara) applied a three-category
scheme to only some of the observational intervals described
above: parents were categorized as (a) not smiling, (b) weakly
smiling, and (c) strongly smiling. We found it difﬁcult, how-
ever, to deﬁne the boundary between weakly smiling and strongly
smiling, in objective terms, to the second coding team (Light-
foot and Sansone). Therefore, the second coding team scored
an expanded number of intervals, dichotomously classifying par-
ents as either (a) not smiling, or (b) smiling, as described above;
this was the data used for the analyses reported here. Smiles were
coded when the corners of the mouth could be seen to be raised
(Ekman and Friesen, 1978). Due to a late-discovered technical
problem with the microphone, few recorded video clips con-
tain audible speech; this was not considered to be problematic
with respect to the original hypotheses the study was designed
to test, pertaining to cradling and handedness, but it does con-
strain our present analyses and conclusions entirely to visual
information.
RELIABILITY
As noted above, there were two coding passes through the data,
using slightly different coding schemes. For purposes of reliabil-
ity assessment, we collapsed the initial coding of weakly smiling
and strongly smiling into a single category of “smiling” and then
directly compared these data with the inherently dichotomous
data of the second coding team. Reliability was assessed as the
agreement on parental smiling in intervals coded by both teams
(25% of the corpus) Cohen’s κ = 0.64. Because the probability
of a 1-s interval being coded as either smiling or not was highly
variable across intervals, and because the coding system was very
simple, therefore this is a very good level of agreement (see discus-
sion in Bakeman and Quera, 2011, pp. 65–68). Landis and Koch
(1977) characterized κ values between 0.61 and 0.80 as“substantial
agreement” (page 165).
RESULTS
An 8 (intervals) × 5 (age group) mixed ANOVA revealed that
parents smiled non-randomly throughout the experimental trials,
F(7,476) = 55.67, p < 0.001. Systematic pairwise comparisons,
with Bonferroni corrections for multiple tests revealed a general
pattern of three “levels” of parental smiling: from a LOW level of
smiling at all time points preceding the doll activation up to the
moment of activation (i.e., the ﬁrst three time points in the trials),
through an epoch of a HIGH level of smiling starting from the
maximum extension of the parental points and ending 3 s after
the doll had stopped moving (i.e., the next four time points in the
trials), and, ﬁnally, an INTERMEDIATE level of smiling at the last
time point measured in each trial, 6 s after the doll’s animation
ceased, as the smiling returned to baseline levels (see Figure 2;
Table 1). In other words, levels of parental smiling within the
“HIGH” level did not differ statistically in pairwise comparisons,
but they did differ from smiling levels in INTERMEDIATE and
LOW, and this pattern held for all three levels of smiling, with
only one exception: within the LOW category, smiling during the
second interval, DOLL ON −3 s, was statistically lower than both
of the immediate adjacent levels, also labeled LOW, but stood in
an identical relation with these adjacent intervals to all intervals
labeled HIGH and INTERMEDIATE (i.e., there was statistically
less smiling in all intervals labeled LOW, compared to INTERME-
DIATEandHIGHsmiling levels). Because ourminimum intertrial
interval was 12 s in duration,we could not extend our observations
later in time during each trial, because this would have overlapped
with successive trials in many instances; this is why our analyses do
not capture a full return to baseline levels by the end of the trials.
Thus, parents encapsulated these episodes of joint attention, in
which they pointed to distant targets, with an envelope of positive
emotion.
There was no inﬂuence of age group, F(4,68) = 0.41, p = 0.799,
nor was there an interaction between interval and age group,
F(28,476) = 1.18, p = 0.242 (see Figure 3). Parents encapsu-
lated joint attention episodes with positive emotion across the
entire age range of our infant subjects, from 6 to 18 months
of age. There was modest, but statistically signiﬁcant variabil-
ity in the number of intervals in which parents smiled across
trials (Greenhouse–Geisser corrected F(4.42, 317.86) = 55.91,
p < 0.001. To determine whether there was any evidence of
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FIGURE 2 | Parents exhibited low positive affect until they pointed, at
which time they exhibited high positive emotion. By 6 s after the doll
had been turned off, they exhibited moderate levels of positive emotion.
These three levels of positive affect were determined by exhaustive
Bonferroni-corrected, pairwise tests.
parental habituation in smiling to the doll animations,we summed
the number of intervals in which parents smiled in the ﬁrst
four trials and compared this to the number of smiles in the
last four trials, ﬁnding that there was a signiﬁcant difference
[paired samples t(72) = −2.09, p = 0.041]. However, there were
more intervals with smiling in the second half of the experi-
ment (mean = 13.3, SD = 8.9) than in the ﬁrst half of the
experiment (mean = 12.1, SD = 7.1), indicating that, if any-
thing, the experiment elicited more smiling with the passage of
time.
We found no inﬂuence of infant birth order on parental smil-
ing behavior [F(2,70) = 1.41, p = 0.252]), nor did we ﬁnd a
relationship between parental age and smiling behavior (Pearson’s
r = 0.05, p = 0.681). Finally, parents did not smile differentially as
a function of infant gender: t(71) = −0.47, p = 0.642.
DISCUSSION
There are two substantive ﬁndings from this study of 73
parent-infant dyads. First, parents displayed peak positive emo-
tion, as evidenced by smiling behavior, that was temporally
synchronized with their pointing gestures and their immedi-
ate aftermaths. Second, this pattern characterized the entire
sample of children from 6–18 months of age. This distinc-
tive pattern of positive emotional display while pointing to
entities has signiﬁcant relevance for contemporary theoretical
interpretations of infant pointing. The dominant, internal-
ist (or telementational – see the detailed analysis and critique
of internalist theories of development by Leudar and Costall,
2004) perspective on human communicative development inter-
prets infants’ abilities to triangulate with others on a common
focus as evidence for infants’ developing abilities to repre-
sent the abstract visual perspective of others, along with the
developing appreciation of others as psychological entities (e.g.,
Povinelli et al., 1997; Tomasello et al., 2007). Thus, in main-
stream cognitive psychology, there is, arguably, an overween-
ing concern with computational models of human cognitive
development; or as Shotter and Newson (1982, p. 37) put it:
“[t]raditional cognitive psychology has now set its sights upon
discoving the nature of the ‘inner computer’ . . . people use
in achieving their actions.” We think that our ﬁndings draw
attention to the external, ecological features of the commu-
nicative environments in which children necessarily construct
their habits of response to the communicative bids of their
caregivers.
This synchronization of parents’ positive emotional signaling
at the peak extensions of their own pointing gestures highlights
Table 1 | Percentage of parents who smiled, by trial, at eight time points within each trial.
Interval
Trial no. Doll on −6 s Doll on −3 s Doll on 0 s Max. point End point Doll off 0 s Doll off +3 s Doll off +6 s Mean of intervals (SD)
1 26 22 27 66 89 72 68 54 53 (25)
2 41 24 33 68 87 82 71 50 57 (23)
3 38 32 38 80 74 85 67 49 58 (21)
4 35 16 35 74 71 74 58 38 50 (22)
5 29 18 32 68 80 74 67 53 53 (23)
6 32 24 31 62 68 73 61 43 49 (19)
7 28 29 38 76 67 70 54 41 50 (19)
8 23 17 29 76 71 68 68 43 49 (24)
Mean of
trials (SD)
31 (6) 23 (6) 33 (4) 71 (6) 76 (9) 75 (6) 64 (6) 46 (6) –
The number of parents whose faces were visible at any given 1 s-interval, on any given trial, ranged from 38–69, mean = 52. Values in parentheses are standard
deviations. Tabled values in bold are the minimum and maximum values in each row (ties are both bolded). Percents reported exclude parents whose faces were not
visible.
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FIGURE 3 | Parents did not differ in the amount of smiling they
displayed for their infants, across the entire age range of this study,
with infants from 6 to 18 months of age.
the environmentally situated placement of key affective infor-
mation about the nature of these joint attention interactions.
This pattern raises the possibility that, in accordance with the
analyses of Moore and Corkum (1994), Zukow-Goldring (1997),
and Rader and Zukow-Goldring (2012), parents may actively, if
apparently unconsciously, shape the attention-deployment pat-
terns of their children, at least in some cultural contexts. If
these patterns of parental affective signaling do exert an inﬂu-
ence on the development of infants’ responses in joint attentional
social frames, then we would predict substantial cross-cultural
variation in these developmental proﬁles (Schieffelin and Ochs,
1989; Triesch et al., 2006; Keller, 2007, 2012). Although there
is not a lot of directly relevant literature, what evidence exists
is consistent with the idea that both the amount of time par-
ents spend in coordinated joint engagement around objects with
their babies and the emotional tones of those interactions differ
substantially across settings. For example, Bakeman et al. (1990)
reported that aboriginal !Kung infants spent only 1.6%of observed
intervals engaged in joint object involvement, compared (with
some qualiﬁcations) with a North American sample (Clarke-
Stewart, 1973), in which about 4.5% of intervals involved joint
object involvement between babies and their mothers. Abels et al.
(2005) reported relatively low levels of joint object involvement
between mothers and their babies in both rural and urban set-
tings in a study from India. Vogt and Martin (2013) reported
substantially fewer co-speech gestures by parents of young chil-
dren in rural Mozambique communities, compared with urban
communities in Mozambique. Salomo and Liszkowski (2013)
observed that Mayan babies pointed with their index ﬁngers at
much reduced rates, compared to both Dutch and Chinese chil-
dren, and also spent signiﬁcantly less time in triadic joint action
than Dutch and Chinese children. Thus, cross-cultural differ-
ences in the incidence of object-centered joint engagement are
well-established, and the present ﬁndings suggest that these dif-
ferences may be accompanied by cross-cultural differences in
maternal affective tone in relation to object-centered coordination
of attention.
The absence from the present study of any apparent inﬂuence of
infant age on parental smiling behavior suggests that this pattern
of gestural/affective synchrony may characterize intersubjectivity
across a wide swathe of infancy and infant competencies. Par-
ents of even our youngest infants (6 months of age) still smiled
most frequently at the peak of their pointing gestures. There is
little evidence of point- or gaze-following ability in Western chil-
dren at this age (e.g., Butterworth and Grover, 1988; Butterworth,
2001; Deák et al., 2008), so if parents are displaying this pattern
of pairing high positive affect with pointing gestures outside of
the laboratory, then this could provide a stable emotional contin-
gency contour around parent-initiated joint attention long before
babies evidently can use these kinds of referential signals and
continuing well into the second year of life. In other words, if
these patterns of affective/referential synchrony are manifested in
the home environments of these babies, then both the babies’
attentional deployments and their attitudes about novel objects
or events may be developmentally shaped into a typical West-
ern pattern of joint object involvement (see, e.g., Moore and
Corkum, 1994; Rossmanith et al., in press). Learning- and eco-
logically based theoretical accounts of the development of joint
attention ability in humans, like those of Shotter and Newson
(1982), Moore and Corkum (1994), and Triesch et al. (2006)
require this kind of stability in these contingent social reward.
Thus, the present study, despite its a posteriori approach, was
sufﬁciently powerful in design to have signiﬁcantly challenged
learning-based accounts of sociocognitive development, by failing
to ﬁnd either (a) that parents did not pair their referential ges-
tures with smiles or (b) that parents only displayed these patterns
for a minority of our age groups. In accordance with environ-
mentally oriented theoretical accounts, the parents in this study
paired their own pointing gestures with smiles across the entire
age range of our sample, with infants from 6 to 18 months of
age. If the present ﬁndings can be extended to the rearing envi-
ronments of children with their families, outside a laboratory
context, then these data suggest that affective-referential syn-
chrony might occur across a vast swathe of human infancy, at
least in Western, post-industrial cultural environments. Thus,
joint attention in humans is situated in a social landscape of
emotional markers for key intersubjective experiences (Churcher
and Scaife, 1982; Shotter and Newson, 1982). Churcher and
Scaife (1982), for example, noted that children learning to follow
the gaze and pointing cues of their caregivers may be moti-
vated not only by the potentially rewarding sight of the indicated
entity, but also the “social reactions” of their caregivers (p. 127;
see Bard et al., 2014, for evidence of the association between
affect and joint attention in infant chimpanzees). Shotter and
Newson (1982) noted that a human child, “although percep-
tually distinguishable from her environment as an individual
. . . is not as such physically isolable from it; she exists (as an
open system) only in mutual relation to it” (p. 34). Thus, our
ﬁndings are consistent with developmental accounts that empha-
size the non-computational, distributed concomitants of joint
attention, insofar as these babies’ social environments displayed
distinctive envelopes of dynamic changes in the expression of
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positive emotion, peaking at the time of parents’ pointing gesture
extensions.
In contrast, nativist accounts of the development of joint atten-
tion in human children, such as those by Butterworth (2003),
Povinelli et al. (2003), and Tomasello et al. (2007) all posit a
species-unique human specialization for triadic joint engagement,
based on hypothetical cognitive and/or motivational capabilities
that are also allegedly unique to our species. What holds these
disparate nativist perspectives together as a class of theoretical
speculation is the postulate that human capacities to follow into
and to direct the attention of others are predicated on evolution-
ary adaptations of cognitive and/or motivational systems in our
lineage, and shared by all extant humans. As Racine (2012; and see,
e.g., Racine and Carpendale, 2007) has pointed out, the hypothesis
of a human biological adaptation for joint attention is necessar-
ily an assumption without empirical foundation. It is, at best,
an interpretive stance on the manifold interactive phenomena of
human caregiver-infant interactions. Importantly, for purposes of
the present argument, these adaptationist approaches to under-
standing the development of joint attention in humans do not
predict (a) the emotional features of the environmental contexts
in which human signaling develop or (b) the cross-cultural vari-
ability displayed in thedevelopment of joint attention. As such, our
ﬁnding of the pairing of positive emotional signals with referen-
tial gestures by adult caregivers neither conﬁrms nor disconﬁrms
an adaptationist interpretive stance; in other words, adaptation-
ist theories are not falsiﬁable on the basis of our ﬁndings. Thus,
the theoretical signiﬁcance of our ﬁndings, in our view, is that we
were able to test a key tenet of learning- and ecologically based
environmental accounts of the development of joint attention in
humans – that the environment must provide a differential reward
structure – and the social learning approach survived this test of its
predictions. Given the distribution of this gestural/affective syn-
chrony in parental signaling across a very large range of infancy,
future studies would add substantially to our understanding of
the integration of emotional and referential signaling in the early
lives of children. For example, this kind of analysis could be
extended to infants’ home environments, like the seminal stud-
ies of Clarke-Stewart (1973, and see Rossmanith et al., in press).
Moreover, future studies should explore the auditory/verbal con-
comitants of referential gestures in caregiver–infant interactions.
Coding archival and future footage of parent-infant interactions
in a range of cultural contexts could provide valuable insight
into cross-cultural patterns of similarity and difference in affec-
tive/gestural synchrony, using these relatively simple measures
of smiling and gestures. Hence, the essential ﬁnding of parents
pairing their deictic gestures with smiles has signiﬁcant relevance
for theory development in this area. For example, the kind of
affective/referential synchrony we report, here, throughout the
infancy period, might complement the dynamic-gesture/word
(visual/auditory) synchrony that ﬁgures prominently in Zukow-
Goldring’s (1997) theory of attention-shaping through perception
of amodal invariants.
With respect to the speciﬁc theoretical concerns of the present
special issue, the present ﬁndings are consistent with environ-
mentally situated accounts of child cognitive development. The
episodes of joint attention that we elicited in the laboratory were
encapsulated with positive affective expression, even though the
parents receivedno instruction todo so. Their spontaneous display
of positive emotion is consistent with Hobson’s (1993) postu-
late of affective bridges to conceptually based social awareness,
a point of view that highlights the embodied, situated nature of
infants’ developing social competencies. The contemporary prac-
tice of attributing developmental change solely to hypothetical,
hidden changes in psychological processes can direct researchers’
attention away from the empirical, psychologically relevant bod-
ily realities of human parent-infant engagement patterns (e.g.,
Shotter and Newson, 1982; Zukow-Goldring, 1997; Reddy, 2001,
2003; Leudar and Costall, 2004; Striano and Bertin, 2005; Leav-
ens and Bard, 2011; Bard and Leavens, 2014). This study suggests
that an increased awareness of the affective components of deic-
tic communication may reveal the previously underappreciated
and public information available not only to researchers but
to parents and young children tasked with building routines of
meaning.
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